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RESTORATION AS A FEDERAL REMEDY FOR ILLEGAL
DREDGING AND FILLING OPERATIONS
DONALD A. HAAGENSEN*
This article presents the federal remedies available to amel-
iorate the damage done to the environment by illegal dredge and
fill operations. The author examines statutory and case law, and
concludes that the federal agencies and courts have the power
to order developers to restore wetlands which have been dredged
and filled without authorization, and that restoration can be an
effective tool for protecting our nation's wetland areas.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The wetland areas' of our nation are becoming increasingly
scarce and vital commodities. In fact, it has been estimated that by
the late 1950's nearly one half of the wetlands in the United States
had been destroyed.2 The plight that has befallen many of our na-
tion's wetlands was best portrayed by Judge William Mehrtens of
the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, in a
case involving the destruction of a mangrove tract in the Florida
Keys:
This property in its natural state, that is before this development
was begun, had been a nesting and feeding sanctuary for a num-
* M.S., J.D., University of Miami; former Survey Editor, University of Miami Law
Review; Associated with Souther, Spaulding, Kinsey, Williamson & Schwabe, Portland,
Oregon.
1. "Wetlands are those land and water areas subject to regular inundation by tidal,
riverine, or lacustrine flowage. Generally included are inland and coastal shallows, marshes,
mudflats, estuaries, swamps, and similar areas in coastal and inland navigable waters." 33
C.F.R. § 209.120(g)(3)(i) (1976).
2. Hearings on the Implementation of Section 404 of the Water Pollution Control Act
Before the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 94th Cong., lst Sess. 13 (1975) (statement by Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.); Comment, Comprehensive Wetlands Protection: One Step Closer to Full
Implementation of § 404 of the FWPCA, 5 ENvik. L. REP. (ELI) 10099 (1976).
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ber of species of wading and shore birds. . . . The bay in this
area was very productive in producing numerous game and com-
mercial species of fish . . . . The shoreline was lined with man-
grove plants . . . . The bay botton was composed of an organic
peaty substance which had accumulated through sedimentation
caused by the wide variety of plant and animal organisms natural
to this area ....
The immediate result of the development in this area was the
complete removal and destruction of all living mangrove plants.
With the loss of the mangroves . . . went all wading and shore
birds previously found in this area. The excavation of the access
channels and canals by the defendants removed the peat natural
to the bottom and exposed the underlining sand or rock.
[fln this area, the mangrove plants and the organic
peaty bottom are absolutely essential to sustain an energy flow
and a healthy marine ecosystem . . . . [T]he mangrove plant
supported by the peaty bottom is an essential element in the life
cycle and the base of the pyramid upon which all higher forms of
life in the bay areas rest ....
'. .[T]he defendants' extensive dredging of canals done
without protective measures being taken, release[d] large
amounts of silt . . . . [tihis act[ed] to suffocate the peat and
other living vegetable forms. Further, as all plants require sun-
light to carry out the process of photosynthesis, the clouding of
the water by silt through the dredging operations blocked off
sunlight, which impede[d] and injure[d] the growth of the
plant life in the bay.'
This total destruction of a wetlands area resulted from dredging
and filling operations4 that were illegal since done without govern-
mental authorization.5 As a result of these illegal activities, the
developer could have been subject to criminal sanctions.' Criminal
sanctions, however, would have afforded no relief for the injuries
3. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 151, 156-57 (S.D. Fla. 1971),
vacated in part and aff'd in part, 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
4. Dredging is the removal of material such as rock, sand, gravel, and mud from the
bottom of a body of water. Fill operations include the addition of materials such as rock, sand,
gravel, and mud to a body of water in order to create a dry land area within the water body
or an elevation of land beneath the body of water.
5. At the federal level the defendant was required to obtain a permit from the United
States Army Corps of Engineers prior to performance of its dredge and fill operations. 33
U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
6. The developer, a corporation, was subject to a potential fine of $500 to $2500. 33
U.S.C. § 406 (1970). Under legislation enacted subsequently, actions similar to the devel-
oper's would have been subject to a fine of up to $10,000 per day per violation and $2,500 to
$25,000 per day per violation if the violating actions had been willful or negligent. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(c)(1), (d) (Supp. V 1975).
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that the developer had caused to the public rights in the mangrove
area. Thus, the trial court, in entering final judgment in a suit that
was brought against the developer, attempted to have undone as
much of the damage as possible by ordering the removal of fill that
the developer had placed in the water, the filling of canals that had
been connected to the water, and the replanting of mangroves along
the water's edge. 7
Developers in the past have dredged and filled in wetland areas
on numerous occasions without the requisite governmental authori-
zation.' Their actions have often resulted from a lack of knowledge
of applicable laws, a belief that such laws did not apply to them, or
a knowledge that even if governmental authorization were not ob-
tained it could be obtained by means of an after-the-fact procedure.'
Since the early 1970's, however, the after-the-fact permit procedure
has been severely restricted,'" and legislation has been passed at the
federal" and state" levels to help control development in wetlands
areas and to protect these areas against unregulated dredging and
filling activities. Even the United States Army Corps of Engineers,
much criticized in the past as a supporter of dredging and filling
projects," has recognized the importance of protection of wetlands
from such unregulated activities: "As environmentally vital areas,
. ..[wetlands] constitute a productive and valuable resource, the
unnecessary alteration or destruction of which should be discour-
aged as contrary to the public interest."'4
At present, legislation is available to protect wetlands areas
7. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Fla. 1976),
remanded from 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'g in part and vacating in part 387 F. Supp.
1404 (S.D. Fla. 1974), remanded from 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), vacating in part and aff'g
in part 331 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
8. As an example, it was estimated in 1971 for Puget Sound in the State of Washington,
that possibly up to eighty percent of the works present in the navigable waters of the Sound
had been constructed without an Army Corps of Engineers permit. Hearings on Protecting
the Nation's Estuaries: Puget Sound and the Straits of Georgia and Juan de Fuca Before the
Subcomm. on Conservation and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 421 (1971).
9. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(c)(1)(iv)(a) (1972).
10. 33 C.F.R. § 20 9.120(g)(12) (1976).
11. The Coastal Zone Management Act, Pub. L. No. 94-370 (July 26, 1976), amending
16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp. V 1975); The Estuarine Act, 16 U.S.C. 4§ 1221-26 (1970); The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. 4 1251-1376 (Supp. V
1975).
12. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE §§ 9-101 to 9-501 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13: 9A-1 to 9A-10
(Supp. 1976).
13. See M. HEUVELMANS THE RIVER KILLERS (1974); Saturday Rev., May 1, 1971 at 49.
14. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g)(3)(i)(1976). See Caplin, Is Congress Protecting Our Water?
The Controversy Over Section 404, Federal Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 31
U. MIAMI L. REV. 445, 452 (1977).
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and to insure that even minor dredging and filling projects are sub-
ject to close governmental scrutiny.'5 Where the avenues for govern-
mental authorization are bypassed, however, and illegal dredging
and filling damages or destroys a wetlands area, there are no surplus
wetlands available for substitution and the finite quantity of such
parts of the public domain is reduced. Criminal and civil monetary
penalties provide little recompense for the loss of such areas. Some
method must be available to salvage these illegally altered areas
and to help to restore them as functioning environmental units of
the public domain. Judicially imposed restoration as a remedy for
illegal dredging and filling activity is available as a tool to help to
replenish the dwindling supply of wetlands areas. Such restoration
is not capable of returning a damaged water environment to pristine
condition, but it can put the water area in a condition more suscep-
tible to rapid natural restoration.
This article examines federal" restorative remedies for illegal
dredging and filling operations. Emphasis is focused in the first
instance on the power sources available for imposition of the rem-
edy. Secondarily, each power source is considered in terms of juris-
dictional requirements, the type of restorative relief available, and
the factors to be weighed in determining the degree of relief war-
ranted.
II. SUBSTANTIVE POWERS CREATING RESTORATIVE REMEDIES
A. Federal Common Law
In England in the late 1700's and early 1800's there was recog-
nized judicially a power in the sovereign to sue in equity for the
abatement or removal of obstructions to the public right of naviga-
tion, such obstructions being termed public nuisances.'7 In the
United States, state courts recognized this same right as a matter
of common law, and state attorneys general possessed the power to
sue to protect state navigable waters.'" When first presented with
15. "Although a particular alteration of wetlands may constitute a minor change, the
cumulative effect of numerous such piecemeal changes often results in a major impairment
of the wetlands resources." 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g)(3)(iii) (1976).
16. Federal but not state remedies are discussed in this article for several reasons. Tradi-
tionally, the federal interest has been dominant over state interests for navigable waters. Also,
while extensive federal legislation which allows restoration has been enacted, there has been
a paucity of such legislation at the state level. Finally, the vast majority of cases in which
restoration has been ordered have been brought pursuant to federal law.
17. E.g., Attorney Gen. v. Richards, 145 Eng. Rep. 980 (Ex. 1795). For a collection of
English cases dealing with obstructions in navigable rivers and the right to their abatement
see Wisdom, Obstructions in Rivers, 119 JusT. PEACE 846 (1955).
18. Eg., Attorney Gen. v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct, 133 Mass. 361 (1882).
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the opportunity to recognize a federal common law prohibition
against public nuisances in the form of obstructions to navigable
waters, however, the Supreme Court of the United States refused
to do so.'0 The Court did note that since the body of water involved
was a navigable water of the United States,'" Congress had the
power to enact legislation regulating obstructions in the water body.
Since Congress had passed no such law, the Court concluded that
the body of water was solely under the control of the law of the state
in which it was located.2
Nine years later the Supreme Court stated, in dictum, that a
court proceeding in equity could take jurisdiction, upon an informa-
tion filed by an attorney general, over a case involving the creation
of a public nuisance by the obstruction of a navigable river."2 Al-
though the Court did not indicate whether it was referring to state
attorneys general or the Attorney General of the United States, it
did cite extensively to the filing of such suits under English law.
Thus, the Court apparently was referring to the Attorney General
of the United States since his position was analogous to that of the
Attorney General of England. Even if the Attorney General did have
the power to bring such an information, 3 the law being applied in
the suit in question was not federal common law, but the common
law of the District of Columbia, from whence the appeal came.24
A subsequent Supreme Court decision, Pennsylvania v. Wheel-
ing & Belmont Bridge Co.,2" was the earliest case to state conclu-
sively that federal common law prohibited obstructions in navigable
rivers as public nuisances. In the Wheeling case the state of Penn-
19. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). In Wilson the
Court was faced with a challenge to a state law which had permitted erection of a dam across
a navigable creek. Although the Court phrased the challenge to the state act solely in terms
of a possible conflict with the power of the government to regulate interstate commerce, the
parties challenging the act argued that it was against the principles of the common law to
obstruct the river in question. Id. at 247. Accord, Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
713, 719-20 (1865).
20. The body of water was a small creek subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; thus,
under the test recognized at that time it was a navigable water of the United States. See The
Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
21. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 252. Accord, Escanaba & Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v. City of
Chicago, 107 U.S. 678 (1882); Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459 (1877); Gilman v. Philadelphia,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865).
22. Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 91, 97-98 (1838).
23. See United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279-85 (1888) in which the
Court held that the Attorney General of the United States had the power to bring a suit in
equity to set aside a fraudulently obtained federal land patent because the government had
an interest to protect, notwithstanding the lack of specific statutory authority to bring such
an action in the name of the government.
24. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 91.
25. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851).
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sylvania sued in equity under the original jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court to have abated as a public nuisance a bridge erected
across the Ohio River in Virginia at such a height as allegedly to
obstruct waterborne traffic. The defendants were private bridge
builders who had been authorized to construct the bridge by an act
of the Virginia legislature. The Supreme Court concluded that the
bridge was a nuisance in fact and that Pennsylvania was entitled
to the relief it sought."6
The court based its decision on several grounds. First, in answer
to an attempt by the defendants to plead authorization by the Vir-
ginia legislature as a defense, the Court noted that Congress had
licensed vessels, established ports of entry, and imposed duties on
officers on boats on the Ohio River. Such acts evidenced a congres-
sional intent to regulate navigation on the river; furthermore, an
interstate compact signed by Virginia stated that the river was to
be free for common navigation and use. These factors were sufficient
to give federal courts jurisdiction over an obstruction constituting a
common law public nuisance on the river.
Second, the Court stated that
the courts of the Union are not limited by the chancery system
adopted by the State . . . . The usages of the High Court of
Chancery in England, wherever the jurisdiction is exercised, gov-
ern the proceedings. This may be said to be the common law of
chancery ....
Under this system, where relief can be given by the English
chancery, similar relief may be given by the courts of the Union. 7
The Court thus recognized a federal common law of nuisance in
equity prohibiting obstructions in navigable waters in the United
States, on the ground that such a common law principle was present
in the chancery court of England."8 Based on these common law
principles, the Wheeling Court concluded that Pennsylvania was
entitled to abatement of the bridge because it had shown that there
was a nuisance in fact and that Pennsylvania had suffered a special
'injury from the nuisance.
The 1851 Wheeling decision was not followed by the Supreme
Court over the next forty years, even though it was argued as applic-
able in four cases which involved state-authorized obstructions
26. The Court stayed execution of the abatement order to give the defendants an oppor-
tunity either to install draws in the bridge or raise its clearance.
27. 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 563-64.
28. See note 17 supra.
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in navigable waters. 29 The Court in these cases either ignored the
Wheeling decision entirely,3' or distinguished it by concluding that
it relied solely on the interstate compact and congressional intent
to regulate navigation."
The Court made no mention of a federal common law prohibit-
ing obstructions until 1888 in the last of the four decisions,
Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch.32 In Willamette, two individu-
als had filed suit to enjoin the construction of a bridge across the
Willamette River in Oregon. The defendants were working pursuant
to an act of the Oregon legislature. The plaintiffs contended that
erection of the bridge would produce a public nuisance in the form
of an obstruction to the river in contravention of the laws of the
United States. The Court held that since there was no diversity of
citizenship between the parties and since the case did not arise
under any law of the United States, there was no jurisdiction for the
case in the federal courts. Further, in considering the public nui-
sance issue the court stated:
[T]here is no common law of the United States which prohibits
obstructions and nuisances in navigable rivers, unless it be the
maritime law . . . . No precedent, however, exists for the en-
forcement of any such law . . . . There must be a direct statute
of the United States33 in order to bring within the scope of its
laws, as administered by the courts of law and equity, obstruc-
tions and nuisances in navigable streams within the States.34
The Willamette Court distinguished the Wheeling decision by
the Congressional intent to regulate navigation, by the interstate
compact, and by the type of navigable waters involved in Wheeling.
The Court pointed to the fact that the Willamette River, although
navigable, was located wholly within the state of Oregon and was
29. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1888); Escanaba & Lake
Mich. Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678 (1882) (by implication); Pound v. Turck,
95 U.S. 459 (1877) (by implication); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 722 (1865).
Even a contemporary opinion of the Attorney General concluded, after citing the Wheeling
case, that the federal government had no power to deal with obstructions to navigation
without appropriate legislation. 15 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 526 (1876).
30. Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459 (1877).
31. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1888); Gilman v. Philadel-
phia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 727 (1865). This position is further supported by a summary the
Court made of its Wheeling decision in a subsequent decision on the Wheeling Bridge contro-
versy. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 430 (1855).
32. 125 U.S. 1 (1888).
33. Not only a federal statute directly prohibiting some act of obstruction but also a
statute creating some federal interest can be judicially enforced. E.g., United States v. Re-
public Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960).
34. 125 U.S. at 8.
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therefore closely tied to local concerns. In contrast, the Ohio River
crossed several states and thus was subject to strong federal inter-
ests. The Court cited several other cases involving intrastate waters
to support this distinction, but the waters in those cases were links
in a chain35 of continuous channels for commerce among the states.
The Willamette decision is open to two interpretations. The
first is that the decision stated explicitly that "there is no common
law of the United States which prohibits obstructions and nuisances
in navigable rivers."3 The second interpretation is that the Court,
by distinguishing the Wheeling decision rather than overruling it
and by emphasizing the intrastate nature of the Willamette River,
may have intended to retain a federal common law prohibiting ob-
structions and nuisances in interstate navigable rivers based on
Wheeling.
The uncertainty concerning the status of the federal common
law raised by the Wheeling and Willamette cases was not resolved.
Subsequent courts either ignored Wheeling and followed
Willamette by finding that there was no federal common law for
obstructions,37 or ignored Willamette and followed Wheeling by al-
lowing enforcement of such a law."
The Supreme Court eventually acknowledged the complexity of
the issue in a case in which federal common law had been pleaded
to establish the prohibition of an obstruction in a navigable body
of water as a public nuisance. The Court declined to resolve the
issue.'"
35. Escanaba & Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678 (1882) (a
navigable river in Illinois which flowed directly into Lake Michigan); Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S.
459 (1877) (a navigable river in Wisconsin which flowed directly into the Mississippi River);
Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865) (a navigable river in Pennsylvania which
flowed directly into the Delaware River which in turn formed the boundary between New
Jersey and Pennsylvania).
36. 125 U.S. at 8.
37. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485-86 (1960) (dictum); id. at
493 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); id. at 509 (Harlan, J., dissenting); North Shore Boom &
Driving Co. v. Nicomen Boom Co., 212 U.S. 406, 412-13 (1909); United States v. Bellingham
Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211, 218 (1900); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 319 F.2d
512, 519-20 (9th Cir. 1963), overruled on other grounds by implication, Wyandotte Transp.
Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967); United States v. Brazoria County Drain. Dist. No.
3, 2 F.2d 861 (S.D. Tex. 1925) (dictum); United States v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining
Co., 53 F. 625, 627 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1892).
38. Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925) (dictum); In re Debs,
158 U.S. 564, 587-93 (1895) (dictum); United States v. Bigan, 274 F.2d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 1960);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 104 F. 691, 693 (8th Cir. 1900) (alternative holding);
United States v. Hall, 63 F. 472, 473-74 (1st Cir. 1894) (dictum); Gulf Ati. Transp. Co. v.
Becker County Sand & Gravel Co., 122 F. Supp. 13, 17 (E.D.N.C. 1954) (dictum).
39. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 196 n.5 (1967).
40. Nor, finally, do we decide whether nonstatutory public nuisance law may
[Vol. 32:105
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In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,4 the Court ignored the
Wheeling and Willamette decisions entirely and considered anew
the question of federal law for public nuisances. The Illinois case
involved a suit under federal common law by the state of Illinois
under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the abate-
ment of pollution being dumped into Lake Michigan by four cities.
The Court held that there was a federal common law prohibiting
pollution as a public nuisance in interstate waters. The Court based
its recognition of such a federal common law on several grounds.
First, the Court noted that numerous federal laws had been passed
to protect interstate waters." Such laws established an area of fed-
eral interest or concern. Second, although the federal statutes did
not provide the remedy Illinois was seeking, federal courts in the
past had fashioned federal common law where federal interests were
concerned, where federal policies were expressed, and where such
federal common law was not inconsistent with the statutory
scheme." Third, since each state at the time of the formation of the
Union had surrendered to the federal government its sovereign
rights to the forceful abatement of a nuisance located outside its
boundaries, each state should be able to call in the federal govern-
ment to protect it from such nuisances." Fourth, apart from the
character of the parties to a controversy, rights in interstate waters
had been held to present federal common law issues.45 Fifth, water
pollution had been previously thought of as a public nuisance, and
it was conceivable that an act creating water pollution in one state
might impact another state by spreading the pollution over inter-
state waters.46
Illegal dredge and fill operations which release pollutants into
the water fall squarely within the proscriptions of the Illinois deci-
sion if the pollutants travel interstate. This generally would not be
form a basis for the relief here sought by the Government. See, e.g., Mayor, etc.
of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 12 Pet. 91, 97, 9 L.Ed. 1012 (1838); United
States v. Hall, 63 F. 472, 474 (C.A. 1st Cir. 1894) . . . . We therefore do not pass
. . . on the question whether such a nonstatutory right of the sovereign has ever
existed in the United States, cf. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S.
1, 8 . . (1888); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 ... (1960)
Id.
41. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
42. Id. at 101.
43. Id. at 103 n.5.
44. Id. at 104-05.
45. Id. at 105-06. The Court noted with reference to this factor that Lake Michigan
borders on four states. Id. at 105 n.6.
46. Id. at 107.
19771
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the case for most of the heavier particulate matter from such opera-
tions, since these substances often settle out of the water in the
vicinity of the project or are restricted to the immediate area by the
use of turbidity screens, impoundments, and the like.47 Fine particu-
late matter in solution, however, can travel great distances. The
potential for the creation of an interstate public nuisance is great,
especially where these particles contain toxic substances or where
toxic substances are in solution after leaching out of fill material."
If transportation of such noxious substances were to occur as a result
of dredging and filling operations, the downstream affected state
would have a valid cause of action under federal common law for
abatement of the nuisance on the basis of the Illinois decision. This
abatement would logically be accomplished through a prohibitory
injunction against further dredge and fill operations" and, if neces-
sary, a mandatory injunction requiring removal of the fill as the
source of pollution.10
Aside from the pollution-creating aspects of an illegal dredge
and fill operation, the probability of such an operation having an
interstate effect is small. Conceivably an obstruction in an inter-
state river could be created by illegal dredging and filling. In such
a case, if the obstruction were significant enough the flow of the
river might be decreased in the downstream state. Under the ration-
ale of the Illinois decision, an action would probably lie for abate-
ment under federal common law.
Although the Supreme Court in the Illinois case referred to the
pollution of "interstate or navigable waters" as a public nuisance,5
only one court has subsequently applied the Illinois Court's recogni-
47. See United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
48. For examples of the types of toxic substances that are found in sediments of some
bodies of water, see Caplin, supra note 14, at 449 & n.14; Comment, Jurisdictional Expansion
of the Army Corps of Engineers Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, 13 HOUSTON L. REV. 135, 142 n.78 (1975).
49. See Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) in which the court held that a
cause of action was stated where the state of Texas had sought a prohibitory injunction under
federal common law against the use by New Mexico residents of a certain pesticide because
it was being disbursed by an interstate river into Texas.
50. Since the actionable wrong would be the creation of pollution and the remedy sought
would be a stoppage of the interstate effects of the pollution, no greater degree of restoration
to a dredged and filled area would be warranted than the removal of the polluting fill.
Suit can be brought by the federal government as well as by a state. Committee for the
Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006, 1009 (4th Cir. 1976)
(en banc); United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp' 556, 558
(N.D. Il. 1973); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972).
51. 406 U.S. 99, 104. The Court stated: "The application of federal common law to abate
a public nuisance in interstate or navigable waters is not inconsistent with the Water Pollu-
tion Control Act." Id. (emphasis added).
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tion of federal common law to pollution in an intrastate navigable
body of water.52 All other federal courts, when faced with the issue,
have concluded that the Illinois decision dictates that this federal
common law apply only to interstate bodies of water where pollution
has been carried interstate. 3 Supportive of this conclusion is the
fact that all of the pertinent cases cited by the Court in the Illinois
decision dealt solely with interstate waters."
The Court noted, however, that in the past it had been willing
to fashion federal common law "where there is an overriding federal
interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or where the
controversy touches basic interests of federalism . . .,, 1 In the
Illinois case, the Court concluded that both of these interests were
present because Lake Michigan is bounded by four states.56 These
interests might also support application of federal common law to
intrastate navigable bodies of water where there is present a federal
need for uniformity or a basic interest of federalism such as the
promotion and maintenance of peace and harmony among the
states. Neither rationale is applicable to illegal dredge and fill oper-
ations in intrastate waters because there is seldom a substantial
effect on interstate activity. Thus, the Illinois decision does not
appear to provide a sufficient basis for imposing an abatement order
or restorative remedy for such activities.
Since neither Willamette nor Wheeling were explicitly over-
ruled or supported in the Illinois decision, the two cases can still be
argued.57 Thus, Wheeling may provide substantive authority for the
abatement or removal of obstructions within intrastate and inter-
state waters. In addition, while evidence of interstate effect is re-
52. United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 672, 679 (D.N.J. 1973) (alternative
holding), vacated on other grounds, 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927
(1975).
53. Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d
1006 (4th Cir. 1976) (en banc); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 520-21 (8th Cir
1975) (en banc); Board of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 562 (E.D. Va. 1976);
see Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., Nat'l Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 213, 216 n.2 (6th Cir.)
(dictum), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974). The Fourth Circuit in Jones Falls speculated
without deciding that the federal common law recognized by the Illinois court prohibiting
pollution as a public nuisance, if applicable to intrastate waters, may well be pre-empted by
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. 539 F.2d at 1009 & n.7.
54. 406 U.S. at 103-07.
55. Id. at 105 n.6.
56. Id.
57. Only one court, however, has cited the older line of decisions for more than historical
value. United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 672, 679 (D.N.J. 1973), vacated on
other grounds, 498 F.2d 597 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975). The body of
water involved in Stoeco was located wholly within the state of New Jersey so it is conceivable
that the older line of cases were cited as support for extending the rationale of the Illinois
decision to intrastate waters.
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quired for activity on interstate waters under Illinois, no such evi-
dence is required by the Wheeling decision. On the other hand, the
Willamette decision seems to overrule part of the Wheeling decision,
since it stated that there is no federal common law prohibiting
intrastate obstructions.
Since actions based upon the Illinois and Wheeling decisions
would be brought pursuant to federal common law in equity, the
judicially recognized prerequisites for such equitable relief would be
applicable. Thus, in order to prevail at trial, the party bringing suit
would have to demonstrate that he had a likelihood of success if the
cause were to come to trial on the merits, that there was a danger
of irreparable harm to him, that he had no adequate remedy at law,
and that the equities were balanced in his favor.
B. Federal Legislative Enactments
1. APPROPRIATIONS FOR STRUCTURES OR IMPROVEMENTS TO NAVIGATION
Prior to the promulgation of specific federal legislation for the
protection of navigable waters, certain federal courts granted relief
by ordering abatement of activities or obstructions in navigable
waters where there was a potential or actual interference with an
identifiable federal interest.5" Sufficient to be recognized as such
federal interests were congressional appropriations for general im-
provements to the navigation of a specific body of water and appro-
priations for erection of a structure in or over the water.5" In addi-
tion, the judiciary was willing to enjoin a work by a private contrac-
tor for the federal government, if the work were not being built in
compliance with legislative requirements and if the work were going
to obstruct a navigable river.'
2. A SELF-EFFECTUATING COMMERCE CLAUSE
Courts in several early cases indicated that navigable waters,
as highways of interstate commerce, could be protected from ob-
58. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1888) (dictum); United
States v. North Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co., 53 F. 625 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1892) (dictum); United
States v. Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co., 3 F. 548 (C.C.D. Minn. 1880); United States
v. Beef Slough Mfg., Booming, Log-driving & Transp. Co., 24 F. Cas. 1064, 1065 (C.C.W.D.
Wis. 1879) (No. 14,559) (dictum); United States v. Duluth, 25 F. Cas. 923 (C.C.D. Minn.
1871) (No. 15,001). Contra, United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211, 214
(1900); Escanaba & Lake Mich. Transp. Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 690 (1882)
(dictum).
59. See cases note 58 supra.
60. United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R. Co., 26 F. 113, 113-14
(W.D. Pa. 1886) (dictum).
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structions at the request of the federal government solely on the
basis of the commerce clause as a self-effectuating power.6 The
courts based their power to provide this remedy on the fact that the
federal government, within the limits of the Constitution, has all the
attributes of sovereignty and that the Constitution assigned the
power over interstate commerce to the federal government. 2 The
possibility of such a power having any practical application as a
basis for restoration, however, is remote since the issue was moot at
the time these cases were decided and is moot at present because
of the extensive legislation that has been enacted to protect both
interstate commerce and navigable waters.
When Congress first began promulgating legislation signifi-
cantly regulating commerce in the late nineteenth century, the judi-
ciary recognized that in spite of the fact that legislation had not
been enacted to protect commerce, Congress had, by regulating
commerce, created an interest which could be protected. In In re
Debs3 the government sued for an injunction against striking rail-
road workers. There had been no federal statutes enacted prohibit-
ing such strikes, but Congress had passed numerous statutes under
the commerce clause regulating the railroad industry. The Court
affirmed the grant of an injunction against the striking workers and
noted:
The national government, given by the Constitution power to
regulate interstate commerce, has by express statute assumed
jurisdiction over such commerce when carried upon railroads. It
is charged, therefore, with the duty of keeping those highways of
interstate commerce free from obstruction, for it has always been
recognized as one of the powers and duties of a government to
remove obstructions from the highways under its control. 4
61. Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425 (1925); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564
(1895); see, e.g., Comment, Substantive and Remedial Problems in Preventing Interferences
with Navigation, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 1065, 1082 n.125 (1959).
62. Justice Harlan, dissenting in United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482,
509 (1960), equated this power with the Wheeling decision federal common law power to abate
public nuisances. There is a distinction, however. The Wheeling type of power is a power
inherent in all sovereigns under an English common law system to abate public nuisances in
areas of the public domain. In contrast, the self-effectuating commerce clause power arises
because of the specific delegation of the power over interstate commerce to a sovereign.
63. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
64. Id. at 586. See also Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); North
Bloomfield Gravel Min. Co. v. United States, 88 F. 664 (9th Cir. 1898). In North Bloomfield
Congress had passed an act prohibiting any hydraulic mining which directly or indirectly
damaged two rivers in California. The act provided only criminal penalties. In spite of the
lack of an appropriate provision, the court affirmed the grant of an injunction against further
dredging by a hydraulic mining company because the interests of the federal government in
interstate commerce as expressed in the statute were entitled to greater protection than the
statute provided.
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Thus, in effect, the Congressional legislation had created an interest
which the courts could protect.
By analogy, if an illegal dredge and fill operation were shown
to be causing an obstruction to or interference with interstate com-
merce over navigable waters where Congress has assumed some
identifiable statutory control over the commerce or the navigable
waters, a federal court would have the power to abate that activity




3. THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT
Congress first assumed statutory control over the nation's nav-
igable waters by passage of section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act in 1890. It is generally accepted 7 that section 10 was enacted
specifically to fill the void created by the holding of the Supreme
Court in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch that "there is no
common law of the United States which prohibits obstructions and
nuisances in navigable rivers." 6
In its present form this section provides in three clauses:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by
Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of the waters of the
United States is prohibited; and it shall not be lawful to build or
commence the building of any wharf, pier, dolphin, boom, weir,
breakwater, bulkhead, jetty, or other structures in any port, road-
stead, haven, harbor, canal, navigable river, or other water of the
United States, outside established harbor lines, or where no har-
bor lines have been established, except on plans recommended by
the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the
Army; and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any
manner to alter or modify the course, location, condition, or ca-
pacity of, any port, roadstead, haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor
of refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or of
the channel of any navigable water of the United States, unless
the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and
authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the
same.
6 9
65. See Comment, Substantive and Remedial Problems in Preventing Interferences with
Navigation, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 1065, 1082-83 (1959).
66. Act of September 19, 1890, ch. 907, 26 Stat. 426. Section 10 and other existing laws
relating to navigable waters were revised, compiled and re-enacted as the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899. 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
67. E.g., United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 663 (1973);
United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485-86 (1960).
68. 125 U.S. 1, 8 (1888).
69. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970). Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C.
§ 407 (1970), also potentially applies to dredge and fill activities. This section prohibits the
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Section 406 of the Rivers and Harbors Act provides for criminal
penalties for violation of section 403.10 In addition, section 406 pro-
vides that the federal government may sue for an injunction for "the
removal of any structures or parts of structures erected in violation"
of section 403.11
The provision for injunctive relief is by its language much nar-
rower than the prohibitions of section 403. Specifically, it appears
that the section 406 injunctive provision applies only to the removal
of structures prohibited by the second clause of section 403, and not
to the other clauses of section 403. The Supreme Court, in the case
of United States v. Republic Steel Corp., confirmed this limited
scope for section 406.72 Certain lower federal courts, however, have
not followed the direction of the Supreme Court and have concluded
that all of the activities prohibited by section 403 are subject to the
injunctive provisions of section 406.13 The difference between ap-
discharge of "any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever ... into any navigable
water of the United States" without a permit from the Secretary of the Army. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132, 1141-42 (S.D. Ga. 1973). Section 13 is of little
practical use at present, however, since its permit requirement has been taken over and
codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V 1975) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972. See Ablard & O'Neill, Wetland Protection and Section 404 of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: A Corps of Engineers Renaissance,
1 VT. L. REV. 51, 76 (1976); Comment, Wetlands Protection Under the Corps of Engineers'
New Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 223, 225 (1976). See generally Caplin,
supra note 14.
70. Every person and every corporation that shall violate any provisions of
sections 401, 403, and 404 of this title . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
$2,500 nor less than $500, or by imprisonment . . . not exceeding one year, or by
both such punishments, in the discretion of the court.
33 U.S.C. § 406 (1970).
71. Id.
72. 362 U.S. 482, 491-92 (1960). The Court stated:
It is true that § 12 [section 406] in specifically providing for relief by injunction
refers only to the removal of "structures" erected in violation of the Act ....
Here again Sanitary Dist. Co. of Chicago v. United States [266 U.S. 405 (1925)1
. . . is answer enough. It was argued in that case that relief by injunction was
restricted to removal of "structures." ... But the Court replied, "The Attorney
General by virtue of his office may bring this proceeding and no statute is neces-
sary to authorize the suit." . . . The test was whether the United States had an
interest to protect or defend. Section 10 of the present Act defines the interest of
the United States . . . . Congress has legislated and made its purpose clear; it
has provided enough federal law in § 10 from which appropriate remedies may
be fashioned even though they rest on inferences.
Id. at 491-92 (citation omitted); accord, Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S.
191, 203 (1967) (dictum). See also United States v. Bigan, 274 F.2d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 1960);
United States v. Wilson, 235 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1956); Kramon, Section 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act: The Emergence of a New Protection for Tidal Marshes, 33 MD. L. REV. 229,
257-60 (1973); 5 SETON HALL L. REv. 121, 124-25 (1973).
73. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306, 1309 (5th Cir. 1976); United
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proaches may appear to be purely academic in light of the fact that
the Republic Steel Court still granted injunctive relief against an
obstruction which was not a structure 4 by using the In Re Debs75
federal interest implied relief approach; however, the difference is
significant since the statutorily designated relief is obtained more
easily than the federal interest implied type of relief. For example,
where injunctive relief is specifically provided as a remedy for viola-
tion of a statute, the only showing courts have required as a prere-
quisite to relief is evidence that the statute has been violated."
Where injunctive relief is not provided by the statute and must be
judicially implied to protect a rtatutory interogt, certain federal
courts have required a showing at least of irreparable harm in addi-
tion to proof of a violation of the statute.7 Thus, if an illegal dredge
and fill activity were treated as automatically invoking section 406,
whether a structure was involved or not, the only prerequisite for
injunctive relief would be proof of a violation of section 403. Con-
versely, if illegal dredge and fill activity were treated as not creating
a structure but as creating some other type of obstruction, altera-
tion, or modification, certain courts would require both a showing
of a violation of the statute and irreparable damage."
For this latter view the meaning of "structure" under the sec-
ond clause of section 403 has great importance. The creation of a
bulkhead prior to the commencement of a dredge and fill project
would be the creation of a structure. The subsequent dredging and
placing of fill inside the bulkhead, however, would not as obviously
be the creation of a structure. The fact that the processes of excavat-
ing and filling are included within the third clause prohibition of
section 403 would seem to militate against their inclusion as creat-
ing a structure under the second clause. On the other hand, most
States v. Cargill, Inc., 367 F.2d 971, 975-76 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd on other grounds sub nom.
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
74. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 (1960).
75. 158 U.S. 564 (1895). See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
76. E.g., United States v. Brookhaven, 2 E.R.C. (BNA) 1761, 1762 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
77. United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 611 (3d Cir. 1974) (dictum), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); Tripp & Hall, Federal Enforcement Under the Refuse Act of
1899, 35 ALBANY L. REv. 60, 79-80 (1970). Contra, United States v. Smith, 7 E.R.C. (BNA)
1937, 1938-39 (E.D. Va. 1975) (dictum); Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 7 E.R.C. (BNA) 1523, 1526 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (dictum), rev'd in part, aff'd in
part and vacated in part, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976), on remand No. 74-469-Civ-WM (S.D.
Fla., filed Dec. 10, 1976); United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 602, 609-
10 (S.D. Fla. 1975), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Underwood, 344 F. Supp. 486, 493-95 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
78. See Tripp & Hall, Federal Enforcement Under the Refuse Act of 1899, 35 ALBANY L.
REv. 60, 80 (1970) for an argument that the government should seek precedents relieving the
necessity of showing irreparable injury as a matter of law.
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dredge and fill projects are associated with creation of a bulkhead
and contemplate the creation of a fixed unit of land.
In United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc.," the Fifth Circuit
concluded that landfills in navigable waters, whether resulting from
intentional or accidental actions, are structures within the meaning
of section 406 and section 403.10 Such a conclusion is not in accord-
ance with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the
subject. For example, in Republic Steel the Court concluded that
the deposit of solids from an industrial outfall into a navigable river
created an obstruction under section 403, but did not create a struc-
ture under section 406.1 The Court in its analysis refuted the argu-
ment that the term "obstruction" in the first clause of section 403
meant only structures, an argument that, if true, would have barred
relief. The Court considered the term "obstruction" to be broad
enough to reach more than just structures in navigable waters, and
in fact broad enough to reach sedimentation clogging a navigable
channel.82 Other courts have likewise reached the same conclusion
that the mere creation of a fill in navigable waters is not necessarily
the creation of a structure within the meaning of section 406 and
section 403. 81
The broad conclusion of the Fifth Circuit, in addition to being
in opposition to decisions of the Supreme Court, results in an illogi-
cal interpretation of section 403. Based upon the rationale of the
Fifth Circuit, every fill, no matter by what means accomplished,
would be a structure within the second clause of section 403 even
though the second clause is specifically restricted to structures that
are built. In addition, the broad conclusion would render the third
clause of section 403 redundant in regard to its provision for filling
operations, since every fill would be a structure under the second
clause. 4
79. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc , 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
80. Id. at 429.
81. 362 U.S. 482 (1960).
82. Id. at 489. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 203 (1967) in
which the Court stated:
That case [Republic Steel] concerned the deposit of industrial solids which, we
believed, created an "obstruction ... to the navigable capacity" of a waterway
of the United States, within the meaning of § 10 of the Act . . . . We concluded
that the authorization of injunctive relief in § 12, which is applicable only to a
limited category of § 10 obstructions (structures), should not be read to exclude
injunctions to compel removal of other types of § 10 obstructions.
Amazingly, the Fifth Circuit stated that "[in Republic Steel the Supreme Court held that
accidental sedimentation which caused the filling of a navigable water constituted a structure
within the meaning of § 406." 478 F.2d at 429.
83. United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754, 757 (2d Cir. 1964); United States
v. Bigan, 274 F.2d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 1960).
84. See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971):
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Despite the overbreadth of the Fifth Circuit's conclusion re-
garding various kinds of fills, it appears that the court's conclusion
that the specific land fill involved in the case was a structure was
justified. The landfill in the case had been created by the erection
of a bulkhead line of large rocks in a bay and by the placement of
fill dredged from the seaward side of the bulkhead into the water
on the landward side of the line to create dry land."5 The dry land
was to be used for a trailer park. The fill and bulkhead thus were
intended to be one unit designed for a specific purpose. The distinc-
tion made by the Third Circuit in an earlier case involving a negli-
gently created fill in a navigable river applies well to the creation
of dry land in this case: "To us that phrase [building or erecting a
structure] connotes the purposeful creation of something formu-
lated or designed, construction work in the conventional sense."88
The elements of purposeful creation for a specific use plus inclusion
of a bulkhead line as a part of the project (specifically recognized
by section 403 as a structure) provide sufficient basis for treating the
bulkhead and the fill together as a single structure and thus subject
to injunctive relief under section 406.87
Construction of an upland canal connected to a navigable body
of water is another type of dredge and fill activity which has engen-
dered differences of opinion as to whether or not its creation is the
building of a structure in navigable waters.8" There is no doubt that
construction of a canal involves creation of a structure within the
terms of the second clause of section 403.89 The problem arises,
however, in determining whether a newly constructed canal was a
structure built in navigable waters as the statute requires. 0 Typi-
The Act [33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970)] covers both building of structures and excavat-
ing and filling in navigable waters . . . .The Act itself does not put any restric-
tions on denial of a permit or the reasons why the Secretary may refuse to grant
a permit to one seeking to build structures on or dredge and fill his own property.
Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
85. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 151, 154 (S.D. Fla. 1971),
vacated in part and aff'd in part, 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), 387 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D. Fla.
1971), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976).
86. United States v. Bigan, 274 F.2d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 1960).
87. See also United States v. Frank Keevan & Son, Inc., 7 E.R.C. (BNA) 1527, 1528 (S.D.
Fla. 1974). In Keevan, the court determined that a roadway built seaward of the mean high
tide line around an island, between the island and the mainland, and along the shore of the
mainland was a structure subject to removal under section 406.
88, Compare Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion with the majority in United States v.
Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 488-89 (1960).
89. Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 621, 628-29 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Weiszmann
v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 7 E.R.C. (BNA) 1523, 1524 (S.D. Fla.
1975); United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 602, 609-10 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
90. See United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485-86 (1960), for the
emphasis the Supreme Court placed on the word "in."
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cally, canals are dredged from the landward side toward a pre-
existing body of water until a narrow plug of land remains between
the canal and the body of water.' The plug is then pulled, connect-
ing the canal to the body of water. Thus, the actual construction of
the canal does not take place in navigable waters. 2 Courts have
supported this proposition by finding that a canal constructed with-
out a permit was illegal under section 403, not because of the con-
struction of the total canal, but because connection of the canal to
the pre-existing body of water altered and modified the course of
that body. 3
Section 406 provides for mandatory injunctive relief in the form
of removal of illegally erected structures, but provides for no other
types of injunctive sanctions against the structure. In contrast, im-
plied injunctive relief, as recognized by the Court in Republic Steel
to protect interests declared by section 403, has available the full
scope of prohibitory and mandatory injunctive remedies within the
equitable powers of a court. Courts have not followed these distinc-
tions, however, and have concluded that both illegal structures and
other activities prohibited by section 403 could be remedied by the
full scope of injunctive relief.9 4
Mandatory injunctive relief, as ordered by the courts, has
ranged from the simple removal of a bulkhead line" to extensive
restoration designed to insure maximum environmental and naviga-
tional benefits. 6 The former relief would come under section 406,
the latter only as an implied remedy to protect the interests of
section 403.
To determine what interests of section 403 are to be protected
from illegal dredge and fill activities by the imposition of injunctive
relief the Supreme Court has outlined these general principles: (1)
"[t]he Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 . . . was obviously intended
to prevent obstructions in the Nation's waterways;"97 (2) the Act
was "a comprehensive law enacted in 1899 to codify pre-existing
statutes designed to protect and preserve our Nation's navigable
91. E.g., United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 602, 604-06 (S.D. Fla.
1975).
92. See, United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 488-89 (1960).
93. Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302,
1304-05 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1298-99
(5th Cir. 1976).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 5 E.R.C. (BNA) 1023 (D. Or. 1973),
aff'd in part and modified in part, 514 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865
(1976); United States v. Baker, 2 E.R.C. (BNA) 1849 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
95. United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 514 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1975).
96. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
97. Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201 (1967).
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waterways;" 8 (3) "[wje read the 1899 Act charitably in light of the
purpose to be served. The philosophy of the statement of Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes . .. that 'A river is more than an amenity, it is a
treasure,' forbids a narrow cramped reading either of § 13 or § 10.""
Specifically, the interests to be protected under section 403 are the
navigable capacity of waters of the United States against obstruc-
tions (clause one), navigable waters against the erection of struc-
tures therein (clause two), and the course, location, condition, and
capacity of navigable waters against excavations, fills, alterations,
and modifications (clause three).
When the Rivers and Harbors Act was first enacted, it was
generally believed that the Congressional purpose for the legislation
was solely to protect navigation. 00 Recent courts, however, have
held that environmental considerations are relevant factors in the
exercise by the Corps of Engineers of its permit jurisdiction'"' and
that environmental damage alone can bring about an alteration or
modification of the condition or capacity of a navigable water under
section 403.102
Early pleadings and decisions involving mandatory injunctive
relief for violations of section 403 were framed entirely in terms of
removal or abatement of obstructions. 3 Even after the Republic
Steel decision established that mandatory relief appropriate to pro-
tect the interests described in section 403 could be granted, court
decisions and pleadings filed by the government evidenced chiefly
a concern to have obstructions removed rather than a concern to
98. United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 663 (1973).
99. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491 (1960). The Supreme Court
added a caveat to this pronouncement in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224,
225 (1966): "The crisis [pollution in our rivers and lakes] that we face in this respect would
not, of course, warrant us in manufacturing offenses where Congress has not acted nor in
stretching statutory language in a criminal field to meet strange conditions."
100. See United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 665 (1973);
Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co., 328 F. Supp. 1140, 1145 (N.D. Ala. 1971); Druley, The
Refuse Act of 1899, 2 ENvm. REP. (BNA), Monograph No. 11 (1972); Comment, Discharging
New Wine into Old Wineskins: The Metamorphosis of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,
33 U. Pirr. L. REv. 483 (1972).
101. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
102. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306, 1310 (5th Cir. 1976). But
see United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045, 1050-51 (D. Del. 1973).
103. United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211 (1900) (removal of a
logboom across a navigable river); United States v. Bannister Realty Co., 155 F. 583
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1907) (removal of a line of pilings from a bay); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 104 F. 691 (8th Cir. 1900) (removal of a clay bar obstructing a navigable river); United
States v. Hall, 63 F. 472 (1st Cir. 1894) (removal of a vessel sunk in a harbor); United States




"restore" the course, condition or capacity of the water body.' 4 In
the early 1970's, however, suits for injunctive relief under section
406 began to reflect a concern for total restoration of the water
environment rather than the simple removal of an obstruction. 5
The impetus for this shift in emphasis stemmed from an increased
national interest in the environment in the late 1960's, the passage
of the National Environmental Policy Act,'10 and a renewed empha-
sis on the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act.'0 7
104. See United States v. Perma Paving Co., 332 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964); United States
v. Town of Brookhaven, 2 E.R.C. (BNA) 1761 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). But see United States v. New
York Cent. R.R., 252 F. Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 1965), aff'd, 358 F.2d 747 (1st Cir. 1966), in which
the court ordered reimbursement to the government by a bridge owner for costs the govern-
ment had incurred in restoring a navigable channel after a bridge had collapsed into the
channel. The bridge owner had removed the span of the bridge but refused to remove the
other remains of the bridge, and the government was forced to do so. The government at trial
sought reimbursement for the costs for removal of the bridge piers, trestles and fenders,
dredging of the channel, filling of holes where piers were removed, and the provision of sheet
metal around the pilings of a nearby bridge for protection. The bridge owner argued that all
of these costs were not related to navigation. The court held that the costs were necessary for
the restoration of navigability for the river and granted full reimbursement to the govern-
ment.
105. United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (D. Del. 1973); United States v.
Pot-Nets, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Del. 1973); United States v. Underwood, 344 F.
Supp. 486, 487 (M.D. Fla. 1972); see United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132, 1134-35, 1142
(S.D. Ga. 1973); cf. United States v. Baker, 2 E.R.C. (BNA) 1849, 1851 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(removal of fill will prevent marsh environment from being destroyed). The Cannon case is
typical of the form of relief sought where illegal dredge and fill activities have occurred: "The
complaint sought temporary and permanent injunctive orders barring further work on the
project and requiring restoration of the 'tidal wetlands' to a condition 'as near as possible' to
the previous natural state." 363 F. Supp. at 1047.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). The Act set forth a national policy of environmental
concern:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the
interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the pro-
found influences of population growth, high-density urbanization, industrial ex-
pansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances
and recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining envi-
ronmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man, declares that
it is the continuing policy of the federal government, in cooperation with state and
local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations to use
all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance,
in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive har-
mony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and
future generations of Americans.
Id. § 4331(a).
107. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-66c (1970). The Act provides in pertinent part:
[W]henever the waters of any stream or other body of water are proposed or
authorized to be impounded, diverted, the channel deepened, or the stream or
other body of water otherwise controlled or modified for any purpose whatever,
including navigation and drainage, by any department or agency of the United
States, or by any public or private agency under Federal permit or license, such
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Ironically, one of the first cases to consider in detail the possi-
bility of restoration for a navigable body of water that had been
illegally dredged and filled began in the Florida Keys in 1971 as
simply a suit for a prohibitory injunction against the illegal activ-
ity.' "8 Five years later, after two appeals and the entry of three final
judgments, the developer was ordered to restore the area by remov-
ing landfill seaward of the mean high tide line, filling in eleven
canals and several channels to designated depths to insure adequate
water mixing and optimum biological productivity,'"0 and replant-
ing a red mangrove fringe along the mean high tide line."" The
restorative work was to be accomplished in the least environmen-
tally disruptive method, using turbidity screens and allowing the
Army Corps of Engineers access to the area to inspect and observe
the procedure."' The estimated cost for restoration was $454,000.111
Although extensive restoration was ordered, total restoration was
not deemed warranted by the court because lots in one section of
the illegally filled land had been sold to individuals and many had
erected homes or trailers there. The court allowed the fill to remain
on this land and did not require mangroves to be planted. In addi-
tion, instead of compelling the complete refilling of the eleven
dredged canals, the court ordered that they be filled to depths vary-
ing from 6 to 10 feet.
Final judgments ordering restoration have been entered in sev-
eral other cases involving illegal dredge and fill activity in the Flor-
department or agency first shall consult with the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service, Department of the Interior, and with the head of the agency exercising
administration over the wildlife resources of the particular State wherein the
impoundment, diversion, or other control facility is to be constructed, with a view
to the conservation of wildlife resources by preventing loss of and damage to such
resources as well as providing for the development and improvement thereof in
connection with such water-resource development.
Id. § 662(a).
108. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla. 1971). Manda-
tory injunctive relief was requested subsequently by the government at trial. The judge
presiding over the suit had doubts at first about both the propriety and the feasibility of
restoration as a remedy:
[N]either I nor anybody else can direct that the property be restored to its
original position .. .I can't restore the land .. .I am admitting it for that
purpose and not with any idea that this court could [restore] the land to its
original condition because only the good Lord can do that, I can't do that.
Record at 375.
109. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1197, 1202 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
The canals as originally dredged averaged 16 feet in depth. Because of the depth and resultant
lack of water circulation, anoxic conditions were observed in several of the canals indicating
a lethal environment for water organisms.
110. Id. at 1202.




ida Keys. In United States v. Frank Keevan & Son, Inc.,"' the
government sought restoration against a landowner who had
dredged rock and soil out of a navigable body of water in the Florida
Keys and had used the fill to create a roadway along his property
below the mean high tide line. The court concluded that the road-
way was an illegal structure constructed in navigable waters in vio-
lation of section 403. The court ordered the roadway to be removed
under section 406 of the Rivers and Harbors Act and ordered the
underlying shoreline restored to gradual sloping contours with red
mangrove trees planted thereon. Estimated cost for the restoration
was $40,000."1 The court made no provisions for replacement of the
fill illegally dredged from the water, and the defendant was allowed
to retain the fill for his own use."'
In a subsequent case involving illegal dredge and fill activity in
the Florida Keys, the trial court ordered the complete filling in' of
two canals excavated by a developer to provide water access to a
subdivision which he was building."' On appeal, the court of ap-
peals reversed the restoration order for one of the canals because it
had been excavated but never connected to a navigable body of
water." '7 The appeals court vacated the restoration order for the
other canal and remanded the case with directions to hold a full
evidentiary hearing to determine the degree of restoration war-
ranted; however, a consent judgment was entered between the par-
ties, and no hearing was held."' The consent judgment provided
that the two canals be allowed to remain with each connected to
navigable waters, but that they be shallowed to specified depths. In
addition, the two canals were to be connected at their landward
ends by a third canal, apparently to insure adequate water circula-
tion."9
113. 7 E.R.C. (BNA) 1527 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
114. Affidavit of Joseph T. Lancaster, filed Oct. 9, 1974, United States v. Frank Keevan
& Son, Inc., 7 E.R.C. (BNA) 1527 (S.D. Fla. 1974). But see Miami Herald, Oct. 2, 1976, § A,
at 18, col. 2, where the defendant claimed that his total costs for restoration were $75,000.
115. The amount of fill removed by the defendant from the navigable body of water was
between 26,000 (court's estimate) and 50,000 (defendant's estimate) cubic yards. Miami
Herald, Oct. 2, 1976, § A, at 18, col. 2. The state of Florida sells fill material from state-owned
submerged land in the Florida Keys (Monroe County, Florida) for $1.50 per cubic yard. 38
Minutes of the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (of the state of Florida) at
9 (June 15, 1971). Thus, the illegally dredged fill the defendant obtained was worth from
$39,000 to $75,000.
116. Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 7 E.R.C. (BNA)
1523 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
117. Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302
(5th Cir. 1976).
118. Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 74-469-Civ-
WM (S.D. Fla., filed Dec. 10, 1976) (final judgment).
119. Id. One other case involving illegal dredge and fill activity in the Florida Keys has
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Not all have been pleased with the extent of the restoration
plans sanctioned by the courts in the Florida Keys cases. 2 The
arguments have been made that something much closer to total
restoration should have been ordered. All of these suits, however,
were suits for equitable relief, and the exercise of sound discretion
by the court is the guiding factor in equitable determinations. Thus,
compromise solutions must often be reached because, in the view
of the court, such a result best balances the prevailing equities.
In the exercise of discretion in an equitable suit, courts have
been willing to go much farther toward giving relief and moulding
remedies where the public interest was being beneitd. 1l In fact,
one circuit has concluded that where injunctive relief is specifically
provided by statute, as in section 406, no weighing of equitities is
required, apparently because of this expressed public interest. 22
Most courts, however, have concluded that whether the requested
relief is an implied injunctive remedy or a section 406 remedy, a
hearing on restoration must be held so that each side may introduce
evidence and attempt to develop fully the equitable factors involved
for the court's consideration.'
reached final judgment. United States v. D.R. Gaines Constr., Inc., No. 75-753-Civ-WM
(S.D. Fla., filed Dec. 10, 1976). In the Gaines case no trial was held and a consent judgment
was entered under which the defendant agreed to remove fill placed along a shoreline below
the mean high tide line, regrade the shoreline, provide a specified type of slope, and plant
approximately 6500 red mangroves.
Additionally, United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976),
is presently on remand from the Fifth Circuit with directions to hold an evidentiary hearing
to determine the degree of restoration, if any, warranted for an illegal dredge and fill operation
in the Florida Keys.
120. See Miami Herald, Oct. 2, 1976, § A, at 18, cols. 1-3; id., Feb. 26, 1976, § A, at 6,
col. 1. In the October article entitled, It Looks Like a Big Slab of Fill, But Shark Key's Been
"Restored," a writer commented on the United States v. Frank Keevan & Son, Inc. case:
A decade ago it was a creature of the Florida Keys environment, covered with
concentric rings of vegetation - red mangrove on the outer perimeter, black and
white mangrove further in and then saltgrass and buttonwood mangrove in the
center.
Now tiny Shark Key, 12 miles north of Key West, is a slab of fill pocked with
holding ponds, and surrounded by the stubble of recently replanted red man-
groves.
Id. Oct. 2, 1976,§ A, at 18, cols. 2-3.
121. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 383 (1965); United States v.
City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30-31 (1940); United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 194
(1939); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937).
122. United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 611 (3d Cir. 1974) (dictum); see
Note, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 469, 474.
123. E.g., United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1301 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045, 1052 (D. Del. 1973). But see United States v.
Baker, 2 E.R.C. (BNA) 1849, 1851 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), where the court determined that no
hearing on the issue of restoration would be held because of the danger of irreparable damage
occurring to a marsh in which fill had been illegally placed.
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In determining the equities involved in a restoration case,
courts have considered numerous factors: (1) the nature and extent
of the environmental disturbance;" 4 (2) the likelihood of success of
the restorative remedy, and whether the remedy will cause more
harm than the illegal activity;' 5 (3) the financial ability of the de-
fendant to effectuate restoration; 2 ' (4) whether the defendant was
acting innocently and in good faith; 1' (5) whether the activity was
performed for personal gain or public good;'28 (6) whether third par-
ties possessing property rights or exercising public rights will be
harmed by restoration;2 9 (7) whether the government has allowed
activities of the illegal type to continue for a lengthy period of time,
and whether the government has unduly delayed in protecting its
rights; 130 and (8) whether development in the area was inevitable.'
124. See, e.g., United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1301 (5th Cir.
1976).
125. Id.; United States v. Kennebec Log-Driving Co., 399 F. Supp. 754, 759-60 (D. Me.
1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 446 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 70 (1976); United States v.
Underwood, 344 F. Supp. 486, 495 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
126. United States v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 514 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1975); Converse
v. Portsmouth Cotton Oil Ref. Corp., 281 F. 981, 987 (4th Cir. 1922); United States v. Joseph
G. Moretti, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Fla. 1976); United States v. American Capital Land
Corp., 8 E.R.C. (BNA) 1654, 1655 (S.D. Miss. 1975); see United States v. Kennebec Log-
Driving Co., 491 F.2d 562, 571 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974).
This factor becomes critical where, as in the Moretti case, it appeared that the
stockholder-officers attempted to bleed the defendant corporation of its assets so that at the
time restoration was to be ordered, the corporation would be financially unable to perform
the restoration. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., No. 71-1176-Civ-WM (S.D. Fla.,
filed Nov. 19, 1976) (memorandum opinion) at 4-5, 7.
Fines imposed under the Rivers and Harbors Act and the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972 (see note 6 supra) can work at cross purposes with a desire to
accomplish full restoration. By the imposition of criminal penalties for illegal activities, a
defendant's financial ability to pay for restoration can be reduced. See McIntosh & Mehta,
Federal Restoration Remedies, 51 FLA. B.J. 155, 156 (1977).
127. United States v. American Capital Land Corp., 8 E.R.C. (BNA) 1654, 1655 (S.D.
Miss. 1975); United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc. 331 F. Supp. 151, 157 (S.D. Fla. 1971),
modified, 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
128. Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 7 E.R.C. (BNA)
1523, 1526 (S.D. Fla. 1975), rev'd in part, vacated in part and aff'd in part, 526 F.2d 1302
(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Frank Keevan & Son, Inc., 7 E.R.C. (BNA) 1527, 1528 (S.D.
Fla. 1974).
129. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1300 n.18 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. American Capital Land Corp., 8 E.R.C. (BNA) 1654, 1655 (S.D. Miss. 1975);
Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 7 E.R.C. (BNA) 1523,
1526, rev'd in part, vacated in part and aff'd in part, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
130. United States v. Kennebec Log-Driving Co., 491 F.2d 562, 571 (1st Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 910 (1974), on remand, 399 F. Supp. 754, 760 (D. Me. 1975); Sierra Club v.
Leslie Salt Co., 412 F. Supp. 1096, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1976); United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp.
1132, 1142-43 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
Although courts may be willing to consider this factor in determining the extent of
restoration to be ordered, they have been reluctant to allow an estoppel to foreclose all relief.
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The protection of innocent purchasers of land in a development
where the land has been created by illegal dredge and fill operations
has proved to be one of the most important factors mitigating
against a court's ordering total restoration. 3 ' Also, the ability of the
defendant to pay for restoration has been of critical importance
since courts have been unwilling to force a defendant into financial
ruin by court-imposed restoration.'33 As an example, both of these
factors played controlling roles in the final resolution of the case of
United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc. 34
When the Moretti suit was first filed, none of the land in the
development had been sold.'35 By the time final judgment was en-
tered in 1976, all lots in one section of the development, comprising
approximately two-thirds of the total land, had been conveyed to
individual third parties. 3 ' Numerous homes, trailers, and other
improvements had been erected on the land. In the first judgment
entered against the developer (Moretti), the interests of these third
party purchasers were not protected by the trial court; all fill placed
seaward of the mean high tide line was ordered removed.'37 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's order so that
Moretti might obtain consideration of an application for an after-
the-fact permit he had filed.'38 The Fifth Circuit did note, however,
that the mandatory injunction ordered by the trial court was
"equitably appropriate."'39 On remand, after the application for an
after-the-fact permit had been denied, the trial court modified and
expanded its prior restoration order. "'
Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302, 1305 (5th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132, 1141 (S.D. Ga. 1973); United States v.
Sunset Cove, Inc., 5 E.R.C. (BNA) 1023, 1027-29 (D. Ore. 1973). But see United States v.
Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 673-75 (1973); United States v. Freethy, No.
C-73-1470 SC (N.D. Cal., Feb. 24, 1975), discussed in Sierra Club v. Leslie Salt Co., 412 F.
Supp. 1096, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
131. Conservation Council v. Costanzo, 398 F. Supp. 653, 675 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd, 528 F.2d
250 (4th Cir. 1975). The court in Costanzo in a remarkably frank opinion concluded that
despite the fact that a required environmental impact statement had not been prepared by
the Army Corps of Engineers and despite the fact that a Federal Water Pollution Control Act
discharge permit had not been obtained, the court would not invalidate a section 403 permit
previously obtained and order restoration. The court allowed after-the-fact processing to
begin for the impact statement and the permit, believing that development of the area was
both inevitable and in the public interest.
132. See cases cited note 129 supra.
133. See cases cited note 126 supra.
134. 423 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
135. 387 F. Supp. 1404, 1407 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
136. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
137. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 478 F.2d 418, 430 n.44 (5th Cir. 1973).
138. Id. at 418.
139. Id. at 421.
140. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
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This new restoration order affected the third party purchasers
only to the limited extent that canals fronting on their lots were
ordered to be filled from depths of approximately 16 feet to from 8
to 10 feet. For the section of land where no lots had been sold, the
court ordered total filling of canals andd planting of red mangroves.
The estimated cost for this restoration plan was one million dol-
lars. 4 ' The case was again appealed to the Fifth Circuit. That court
vacated the restoration order and remanded the case so that a full
evidentiary hearing could be held to determine "the feasibility and
environmental advisability" of restoration.' On remand, a hearing
was held at which the government and Moretti each presented eco-
logical reports.'43 The court accepted the government's environ-
mental findings and plan for restoration, while distinguishing Mo-
retti's contradictory ecological facts. The court ordered restoration
identical to its prior one million dollar plan except that the canals
in the uninhabited section of the development were to be filled to
designated depths rather than being filled totally. The cost for this
final restoration plan was estimated at $454,000. The court noted
that this cost was approximately equal to Moretti's current and
long term receivables and thus was within the corporation's finan-
cial abilities. The corporation was not placed in danger of financial
ruin because it had land available for sale which had been appraised
at $950,000.
In the final analysis, the court appeared to be protecting the
third party purchasers of lots to the maximum extent possible by
allowing fill to remain in that area seaward of the mean high tide
line and allowing the canals providing access to the individuals'
properties to remain. The court appeared to be attempting to obtain
the maximum degree of restoration possible for the uninhabited
section, consonant with the defendant's financial ability to pay.
Perhaps the court's final weighing of the equities did not result
in the scales of justice coming to rest in a balanced position. As the
court noted, Moretti flagrantly violated section 403, refused to do
equity, had its two sole stockholder-officers draw salaries of $250,000
over the five years of the lawsuit even though the corporation was
inactive, and gained forty-eight waterfront lots for sale in the unin-
habited parcel.'44 In addition, all of the individuals who purchased
141. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1197, 1200 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
142. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F. 2d 1306, 1310 (5th Cir. 1976).
143. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 1197 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
Possibly presaging its opinion, the court characterized the government's expert as "an excep-
tionally well-qualified marine biologist" and Moretti's expert as the "defendant's ecologist."
Id. at 1198-99.
144. Id. at 1200-02.
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land at the Moretti development did so after the government filed
suit. Finally, Moretti had assets of $950,000 in the form of salable
land over and above the amount the restoration ordered by the court
required. All of these factors would seem to indicate that Moretti
profited in the long run from its illegal activity at the expense of the
natural environment of the area.
4. THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972
The objective of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA) was "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters."'45 Toward that end the FWPCA prohibits, with certain excep-
tions, "the discharge of any pollutant by any person" into navigable
waters.'" Pollutant is defined to include dredged spoil, rock, gravel,
and sand discharged into water.'47 One exception to this general
prohibition against discharge of pollutants is that the Army Corps
of Engineers "may issue permits . ..for the discharge of dredged
or fill material into the navigable waters ... ,, "4 Thus, under the
FWPCA, dredge and fill operations, to the extent that they result
in the release of dredge or fill material into navigable waters, are
illegal unless performed under proper authorization.'49
Since illegal discharges are prohibited, it is apparent that dis-
charges from illegal dredge and fill activity can be abated judi-
cially.'50 Also, administrative compliance orders can be issued to
order abatement of discharge. 5' However, the availability of resto-
ration under the FWPCA as a remedy for illegal dredge and fill
operations is not as clear. The enforcement section of the FWPCA
provides that the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, whenever he finds the discharge of a pollutant into naviga-
ble waters by a person without proper authorization, "shall issue an
145. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp V 1975).
146. Id. § 1311(a).
147. Id. § 1362(6).
148. Id. § 1344(a).
149. See Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 7 E.R.C.
(BNA) 1523, 1526 (S.D. Fla. 1975), rev'd in part, vacated in part and aff'd in part, 526 F.2d
1302, 1306 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirmed on FWPCA aspects). But see 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(5)
(1976). This regulation defines discharge of dredged material as "any addition of dredged
material, in excess of one cubic yard when used in a single or incidental operation, into
navigable waters." (Emphasis added). The term "addition" implies that spillover during the
dredging process is not considered a discharge of dredged material. The Corps of Engineers
has supported this conclusion. 40 Fed. Reg. 31321 (1975). Under this analysis only fill opera-
tions would come under FWPCA jurisdiction.
150. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b) (Supp. V 1975).
151. Id. at § 1319(a).
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order requiring such person to comply [with the prohibition against
pollutant discharges or] shall bring a civil action [against the per-
son].b ' 52 The compliance order can only order the person to comply;
it cannot order restoration. The civil action, on the other hand, may
be brought "for appropriate relief, including a permanent or tempo-
''153rary injunction ....
"Appropriate relief" implies relief of a type appropriate to pro-
tect navigable waters from the conduct prohibited by the FWPCA
- discharge of a pollutant. If the pollutant (here dredged spoil or
fill) has been discharged already, however, appropriate relief would
imply removal of the pollutant, and thus restoration of the body of
water to the condition which was protected by the FWPCA.114
Courts have supported this construction of the Act and have ordered
removal from navigable waters of illegally discharged fill or dredged
spoil and restoration of the water areas.'55
Restoration under the FWPCA, however, has never been or-
dered for damage caused by the act of illegal dredging per se. Resto-
ration for such activity has only been ordered pursuant to sections
403 or 406 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.'56 The courts have thus
created a dichotomy for dredge and fill operations, treating the act
of dredging under the Rivers and Harbors Act and the act of dis-
charging from dredging and filling under the FWPCA.57
152. Id. at § 1319(a)(3).
153. Id. at § 1319(b).
154. Power to order a restorative remedy could also be fashioned by using the rationale
of United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960), to imply an injunctive remedy
to protect an interest created by a statute. See notes 63-64, 74 and accompanying text supra;
Ipsen & Raisch, Enforcement Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
of 1972, 9 LAD & WATER L. REv. 369, 393 (1974).
A removal type remedy may have been contemplated by the Senate Committee on Public
Works in its report on the FWPCA: "Under the Refuse Act [33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970)] the
Federal Government is not constrained in any way from acting against violators. The Com-
mittee continues that authority in this Act." 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3730. The
Refuse Act had been interpreted to supply a sufficient governmental interest for a court to
issue an injunction compelling removal of an obstruction caused by refuse flowing into navi-
gable waters in violation of the Refuse Act. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S.
482 (1960) (by implication).
155. United States v. Smith, 7 E.R.C. (BNA) 1937, 1939 (E.D. Va. 1975); United States
v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 677 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
156. E.g., Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 7 E.R.C.
(BNA) 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1975), rev'd in part, vacated in part and aff'd in part, 526 F.2d 1302
(5th Cir. 1976).
157. See Sierra Club v. Leslie Salt Co., 412 F. Supp. 1096, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(FWPCA jurisdiction for the "discharge of dredged or fill material"; Rivers and Harbors Act
jurisdiction for the "construction of any bridge, dam, dike or causeway, or for the creation of
any new obstruction"); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp.
162 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1974) (FWPCA jurisdiction for the discharge
of dredged and fill material; Rivers and Harbors Act jurisdiction for construction of intake
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By using the rationale of the Republic Steel decision, that is,
implying a remedy to protect a statutorily declared interest,'," it
could be argued that the mere illegal act of dredging, where it de-
grades the chemical, physical or biological integrity of a navigable
water,' could justify a restoration order. Such a position does not
have support, however, in the language of the specific prohibition
sections of the FWPCA. These sections prohibit the discharge of any
pollutant into navigable waters without a permit, but do not refer
to a permit authority for or a prohibition of the act of dredging.'
The Corps of Engineers, as the agency charged with jurisdiction over
dredge and fill activity, has followed this pattern by confining its
FWPCA permit authority solely to discharges of dredge or fill mate-
rial.'
III. CONCLUSION
Judicially imposed restoration orders can provide an effective
tool for mitigating the effects of illegal dredge and fill operations in
wetlands areas. In addition, there are some who believe that restora-
tion can turn an irreparably damaged water area into an environ-
ment sufficiently receptive to natural restorative processes to allow
the area eventually to return to its pristine condition."'6 With nearly
fifty percent of the nation's wetlands filled, drained or diked, and
with demand for such' areas ever increasing, restoration has become
a significant judicial remedy.
Federal common law principles can provide a possible basis for
granting restorative relief, especially where an interstate effect from
the illegal activity can be shown. Section 403 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act also can provide a jurisdictional basis for an order
requiring restoration. Relief based on section 403 is available where
illegal dredge and fill activity has altered or modified the course,
condition, or capacity of navigable waters. Section 406 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act provides power for the removal of illegal dredge
and fill structures constructed in navigable waters. Finally, the
FWPCA establishes a substantive basis for removal of fill or dredged
facilities of power plant but preempted by the Federal Power Act); Ablard & O'Neill, Wetland
Protection and Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972:
A Corps of Engineers Renaissance, 1 VT. L. REv. 51, 93-94 (1976).
158. See notes 63-64, 74 and accompanying text supra.
159. This interest is declared by the statement of purpose of the FWPCA. 33 U.S.C. §
1251(a) (Supp. V 1975).
160. Id. at §§ 1311(a), 1344(a), 1362(6).
161. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(e)(2) (1976).
162. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 151, 157 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
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spoil illegally placed in navigable waters and in turn the restoration
of the water environment.
Although the judiciary at present has the power to order total
restoration, courts have been reluctant to do so. Appropriately,
courts have chosen to weigh the equities involved for each party
and, as a result, have usually ordered partial restoration. As the
demands on wetlands areas increase, however, their preservation
and protection will become a paramount public interest. At such
time, orders approaching total restoration for illegal dredge and fill
operations will become more desirable and more prevalent.
